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Civic Engagement as a Constraint on Corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Kenju Kamei
  • Louis Putterman
  • Katy Tabero
  • Jean-Robert Tyran

Abstract

Corruption is the great disease of government. It undermines the efficiency of the public sector in many countries around the world. We experimentally study civic engagement (CE) as a constraint on corruption when incentives are stacked against providing CE. We show that CE is powerful in curbing corruption when citizens can encourage each other to provide CE through social approval. Social approval induces strategic complementarity among conditional cooperators which counteracts the strategic substitutability (which tends to limit beneficial effects of CE) built into our design. We also show that civic engagement in the lab is correlated with civic engagement in the field, and that the effects of social approval are surprisingly robust to framing in our setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman & Katy Tabero & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2024. "Civic Engagement as a Constraint on Corruption," Working Papers 2024-003, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2024-003
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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