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Dual Pricing in a Model of Sales

Author

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  • Nicolas Schutz
  • Anton Sobolev

Abstract

We study the competitive effects of dual pricing, a vertical restraint that involves charging a distributor a different price for units intended to be resold online than for units intended to be resold offline. We develop a model in which a manufacturer contracts with hybrid retailers, which sell the manufacturer’s product both in their brick-and-mortar stores and through an online channel. We find that dual pricing allows the manufacturer to induce the industry monopoly outcome whereas uniform pricing does not. Yet, dual pricing does not necessarily harm consumers or society at large, as the market outcome is distorted by market power regardless of whether dual or uniform pricing is used. Indeed, we find that consumer surplus and aggregate surplus tend to be higher under dual pricing if the online market is small, if the search costs faced by offline consumers are high, and if the pass-through rate of cost increases is high.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Schutz & Anton Sobolev, 2025. "Dual Pricing in a Model of Sales," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_678, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_678
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp678
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joao Montez & Nicolas Schutz, 2021. "All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventory Choices [Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2407-2438.
    2. Sandro Shelegia & Chris M. Wilson, 2021. "A Generalized Model of Advertised Sales," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 195-223, February.
    3. Alberto Cavallo, 2017. "Are Online and Offline Prices Similar? Evidence from Large Multi-channel Retailers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(1), pages 283-303, January.
    4. Dmitry Lubensky, 2017. "A model of recommended retail prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(2), pages 358-386, May.
    5. G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, 1984. "An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 27-38, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dual pricing; price dispersion; search; vertical restraints;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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