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Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device

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  • Martimort, David
  • Pouyet, Jérôme

Abstract

A retailer may boost demand for a manufacturer’s product through unobservable promotional efforts. Fixed fees cannot be used to freely allocate profit within the vertical structure. When manufacturers have market power, the equilibrium wholesale contract features a retail price below cost together with a rebate for incremental units bought by the retailer when effort has succeeded in boosting sales. Loss leading emerges as an incentive device in such an incomplete contracting scenario. A ban on below-cost pricing leads to a higher retail price and a lower promotional effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2024. "Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device," TSE Working Papers 24-1564, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:129692
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bliss, Christopher, 1988. "A Theory of Retail Pricing," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 375-391, June.
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    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    6. Pierre Biscourp & Xavier Boutin & Thibaud Vergé, 2013. "The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices: Evidence from the Loi Galland," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(12), pages 1279-1312, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vertical restraints; loss leading; promotional allowances; below-cost; pricing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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