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Controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales

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  • João Montez

Abstract

type="main"> In a make-to-stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market-wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power. We conclude that a more lenient policy toward RPM is unlikely to affect the producer's ability to control opportunism.

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  • João Montez, 2015. "Controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 650-670, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:46:y:2015:i:3:p:650-670
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    1. Ying-Ju Chen & Zhengqing Gui & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2024. "Supply Chain Frictions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_528, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    2. Doganoglu, Toker & Inceoglu, Firat, 2020. "Buyback contracts to solve upstream opportunism," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(3), pages 875-884.
    3. Lømo, Teis Lunde, 2015. "Risk sharing mitigates opportunism in vertical contracting," Working Papers in Economics 10/15, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    4. Calcagno, Claudio A. & Giardino-Karlinger, Liliane, 2019. "Collective exclusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 326-375.
    5. Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore & Reisinger, Markus, 2021. "Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    6. Do, Jihwan & Miklós-Thal, Jeanine, 2023. "Partial secrecy in vertical contracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    7. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Apostolis Pavlou, 2020. "Foreign direct investment in vertically related markets," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 284-320, February.
    8. Florence THEPOT & Jacques THEPOT, 2017. "Collusion, Managerial incentives and antitrust fines," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2017-06, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.

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