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Organized Voters: Elections and Public Funding of Nonprofits

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  • Camille Urvoy

Abstract

What makes politicians respond to civil society organizations’ demands? I use new data on government transfers to French associations and exploit close elections to show that politicians grant more funds to ideologically close organizations when the local incumbent is a political ally and was elected by a small margin. The results are consistent with politicians and organizations exchanging financial support for electoral support. Organizations secure funding because of the votes they can deliver, not because of their campaign contributions; however the fact that transfers appear to be conditioned on support may undermine their ability to help hold politicians accountable.

Suggested Citation

  • Camille Urvoy, 2024. "Organized Voters: Elections and Public Funding of Nonprofits," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_601, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_601
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp601
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    civil society organizations; elections; distributive politics; clientelism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

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