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Platform-Enabled Information Disclosure

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  • Jacopo Gambato
  • Martin Peitz

Abstract

We analyze consumers’ voluntary information disclosure in a platform setting. For given consumer participation, the platform and sellers tend to prefer limited disclosure of consumer valuations, in contrast to consumers. With endogenous consumer participation, seller and platform incentives may be misaligned, and sellers may be better off when consumers can disclose their valuations. A regulator acting in the best interest of consumers and/or sellers may want to intervene and force the platform to employ a disclosure technology that enables consumers to voluntarily disclose information from a richer message space.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacopo Gambato & Martin Peitz, 2023. "Platform-Enabled Information Disclosure," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_468, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_468
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp468
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heiko Karle & Martin Peitz & Markus Reisinger, 2020. "Segmentation versus Agglomeration: Competition between Platforms with Competitive Sellers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(6), pages 2329-2374.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Peitz, 2024. "The Economic Theory of Two-Sided Platforms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_584, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    2. Martin Peitz, 2023. "Governance and Regulation of Platforms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_480, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-sided platform; platform governance; information disclosure; information design; privacy regulation; e-commerc;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising

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