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L imposta sul valore aggiunto: regime ordinario e regime del margine a confronto. Il caso del mercato dell arte. A general comparison between different VAT Regimes: the normal vs the special scheme. An application to the art market

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  • G. Candela
  • E. Randon
  • A. E. Scorcu

Abstract

In letteratura, il confronto tra i metodi di calcolo dell imposta sul valore aggiunto (regime ordinario e regime del margine) limitato: si riduce al risultato di equivalenza ottenuto con aliquote identiche e uniformi nelle diverse fasi della produzione e dello scambio. In questo lavoro proponiamo un analisi comparativa generale per stabilire la desiderabilit di un metodo rispetto all altro in relazione alla struttura delle aliquote, alla tipologia dei soggetti coinvolti, alle politiche di commercializzazione. I risultati sono applicati per valutare il meccanismo di formazione dei prezzi nel mercato dell arte. Si propongono degli interventi di riforma per rendere il regime fiscale neutrale e trasparente, incentivando scambi e investimenti. In the literature, the comparison between the normal and the special VAT regime is limited (i.e. if the VAT rates are equal and uniform in each production or consumption phase, then the two regimes are identical). In this paper we propose a general comparison in order to define which regime is desirable in relation to the structure of the VAT rates, the features of the buyers and sellers, the selling strategies. We propose some policy reforms in order to make neutral the fiscal regime, boosting investments and consumption. The results are applied to the art market.

Suggested Citation

  • G. Candela & E. Randon & A. E. Scorcu, 2012. "L imposta sul valore aggiunto: regime ordinario e regime del margine a confronto. Il caso del mercato dell arte. A general comparison between different VAT Regimes: the normal vs the special scheme. A," Working Papers wp838, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp838
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    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services

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