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Endogenous Timing in Quality Investments and Price Competition

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  • L. Lambertini
  • A. Tampieri

Abstract

We modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, in which firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed-strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than its complement to one. In the alternative of full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide.

Suggested Citation

  • L. Lambertini & A. Tampieri, 2012. "Endogenous Timing in Quality Investments and Price Competition," Working Papers wp815, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp815
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
    2. d'Aspremont, C. & Gerard-Varet, L. -A., 1980. "Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 201-217, October.
    3. Lambertini, Luca & Tampieri, Alessandro, 2012. "Low-quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with Cournot competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 396-398.
    4. Reiko Aoki, 2003. "Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 653-672, March.
    5. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    6. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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