Failing Firm Defense with Entry Deterrence
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- Alessandro Fedele & Massimo Tognoni, 2010. "Failing Firm Defence With Entry Deterrence," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 365-386, October.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Bernard Franck & Nicolas Le Pape, 2010.
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- Barnard Franck & Nicolas Le Pape, 2010. "Bankruptcy Risk, Product Market Competition and Horizontal Mergers," TEPP Working Paper 2010-19, TEPP.
- Bernard Franck & Nicolas Le Pape, 2020. "The limited liability effect: Implications for anticompetitive horizontal mergers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(6), pages 2082-2102, December.
- Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst, 2008. "Do Consumers Benefit from Concentration in the New Economy? A Review of Google's Mergers, Acquisitions, and Arrangements," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-121, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2006-09-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2006-09-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-FMK-2006-09-03 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-IND-2006-09-03 (Industrial Organization)
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