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Sequential cross-border mergers

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  • Fumagalli, Eileen
  • Vasconcelos, Helder

Abstract

This paper proposes a sequential merger formation game to study how trade policy can influence firms' choice between intra-national and cross-border mergers in an international Cournot oligopoly with a cost structure à la Perry and Porter [Perry, M. and Porter, R.H., 1985. Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger. American Economic Review 75(1), 219-227.]. We find that the equilibrium market structure depends heavily on: (i) the level of trade costs; and (ii) whether or not active antitrust authorities are incorporated within the sequential merger game. In addition, it is shown that whenever mergers occur in equilibrium, they occur in waves and the merger wave comprises at least one cross-border merger.

Suggested Citation

  • Fumagalli, Eileen & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2009. "Sequential cross-border mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 175-187, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:2:p:175-187
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Borja Mesa-Sánchez, 2017. "Preemptive Mergers in a Vertically Differentiated Unionized Oligopoly," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(5), pages 511-540, September.
    2. Eileen Fumagalli & Tore Nilssen, 2019. "Sweetening the Pill: a Theory of Waiting to Merge," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 351-388, September.
    3. Steven Brakman & Harry Garretsen & Charles van Marrewijk & Charles van Marrewijk, 2015. "The Location of Cross-Border Mergers & Acquisitions in the USA," CESifo Working Paper Series 5331, CESifo.
    4. Quan Dong & Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz, 2021. "Cross-border acquisitions from developing countries under decreasing returns to scale," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 20(3), pages 297-317, September.
    5. Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2014. "Acquisitions by Multinationals and Trade Liberalization," Discussion Paper 2014-006, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2013. "Wage Bargaining And Merger Incentives With Asymmetric Costs," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65, pages 56-84, May.
    7. Jing Yan, 2018. "Do Merger Laws Deter Cross‐Border Mergers and Acquisitions?," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 376-393, September.
    8. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2011. "Strategic managerial delegation and cross-border mergers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 49-89, September.
    9. Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore, 2008. "Waiting to Merge," Memorandum 13/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    10. Bertrand, Olivier & Betschinger, Marie-Ann, 2012. "Performance of domestic and cross-border acquisitions: Empirical evidence from Russian acquirers," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 413-437.
    11. Matsushima Noriaki & Sato Yasuhiro & Yamamoto Kazuhiro, 2013. "Horizontal Mergers, Firm Heterogeneity, and R&D Investments," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 959-990, August.
    12. Nakamura, Yasuhiko, 2011. "Bargaining over managerial delegation contracts and merger incentives in an international oligopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 47-61, March.

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