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Network design and imperfect defense

Author

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  • Landwehr, Jakob

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

The question how to optimally design an infrastructure network that may be subject to intelligent threats is of highest interest. We address this problem by considering a Designer-Adversary game of optimal network design for the case of imperfect node defense. In this two-stage game, first the Designer defends network connectivity by forming costly links and additionally protecting nodes. Then, the Adversary attacks a fixed number of nodes, aiming to disconnect the network. In contrast to the existing literature, defense is imperfect in the sense that defended nodes can still be destroyed with some fixed probability. We completely characterize the solution of the game for attack budgets of one and two nodes, while for larger budget we present a partial characterization of the solution. To do so, we determine the minimum number of links necessary to construct a network with any degree of connectivity and any given number of essential nodes.

Suggested Citation

  • Landwehr, Jakob, 2015. "Network design and imperfect defense," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 537, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:537
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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2722545/2722546
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Britta Hoyer & Kris De Jaegher, 2016. "Strategic Network Disruption and Defense," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(5), pages 802-830, October.
    2. B. Hoyer, 2012. "Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect," Working Papers 12-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
    3. Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2014. "Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1518-1542.
    4. Cerdeiro, Diego & Dziubinski, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2015. "Contagion Risk and Network Design," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 206416, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    5. Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2013. "Network design and defence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 30-43.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bravard, Christophe & Charroin, Liza & Touati, Corinne, 2017. "Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 62-79.
    2. Britta Hoyer & Kris De Jaegher, 2023. "Network disruption and the common-enemy effect," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 117-155, March.
    3. Hans Haller, 2015. "Network Vulnerability: A Designer-Disruptor Game," Working Papers e07-50, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network Defense; Designer-Adversary Games; Network Design; NodeDestruction;
    All these keywords.

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