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Simultaneous Elections

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  • Enriqueta Aragonès

Abstract

This paper analyzes the possible electoral advantages and disadvantages of a unique party that completes in two simultaneous elections with respect to those obtained when it competes as two different parties. I assume that a unified party has a larger strategy set but it is forced to choose the same policy in both elections. I analyze different scenarios depending on the features of the electorates and of the party configuration that it faces: the same party or two different parties. In all cases I show that a unified party can only fare better than two independent parties when the two electorates are similar enough. In this case the pasty may obtain the vote of the moderates in both elections. If the electorates are aligned with the opponent the gains from unification are more likely in more polarized electorate. Otherwise, the losses from unification increase with the intensity of the electoral competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Enriqueta Aragonès, 2023. "Simultaneous Elections," Working Papers 1425, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1425
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marina Agranov, 2016. "Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility, and the Selection of Candidates," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 61-85, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    simultaneous elections; state-wide parties; sub-national parties;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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