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Cardinal Assignment Mechanisms: Money Matters More than it Should

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Listed:
  • Caterina Calsamiglia
  • Francisco Martinez-Mora
  • Antonio Miralles

Abstract

Most environments where (possibly random) assignment mechanisms are used are such that participants have outside options. For instance private schools and private housing are options that participants in a public choice or public housing assignment problems may have. We postulate that cardinal mechanisms, as opposed to ordinal mechanisms, may be unfair for agents with less access to outside options. Chances inside the assignment process could favor agents with better outside options.

Suggested Citation

  • Caterina Calsamiglia & Francisco Martinez-Mora & Antonio Miralles, 2020. "Cardinal Assignment Mechanisms: Money Matters More than it Should," Working Papers 1150, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1150
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Caterina Calsamiglia & Francisco Martinez-Mora & Antonio Miralles, 2017. "Sorting in public school districts under the Boston Mechanism," Discussion Papers in Economics 17/10, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    random assignments; ordinal vs. cardinal mechanisms; outside options; unequal access;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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