IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bfi/wpaper/2020-98.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Financial Fragility in the COVID-19 Crisis: The Case of Investment Funds in Corporate Bond Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Falato

    (Federal Reserve Board - Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)

  • Itay Goldstein

    (University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School)

  • Ali Hortaçsu

    (University of Chicago - Department of Economics)

Abstract

In the decade following the financial crisis of 2008, investment funds in corporate bond markets became prominent market players and generated concerns of financial fragility. The COVID-19 crisis provides an opportunity to inspect their resilience in a major stress event. Using daily microdata, we document major outflows in these funds during this period, far greater than anything they experienced in past events. Large outflows were sustained over several weeks and were widespread across funds. Inspecting the role of sources of fragility, we show that both the illiquidity of fund assets and the vulnerability to fire sales were important factors in explaining outflows. The exposure to sectors most hurt by the COVID-19 crisis was also important. By providing a liquidity backstop for their bond holdings, the Federal Reserve bond purchase program helped to reverse outflows especially for the most fragile funds. The impact materialized quickly after announcement and was large over the post-crisis period among funds that held bonds eligible for purchase. In turn, the Fed bond purchase program had spillover effects, stimulating primary market bond issuance by firms whose outstanding bonds were held by the impacted funds and stabilizing peer funds whose bond holdings overlapped with those of the impacted funds. The evidence points to a new "bond fund fragility channel" of the Federal Reserve liquidity backstop whereby the Fed bond purchases transmit to the real economy via bond funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Falato & Itay Goldstein & Ali Hortaçsu, 2020. "Financial Fragility in the COVID-19 Crisis: The Case of Investment Funds in Corporate Bond Markets," Working Papers 2020-98, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2020-98
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.bfi.uchicago.edu/RePEc/pdfs/BFI_WP_202098.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeremy C. Stein, 2012. "Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(1), pages 57-95.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-1366, September.
    3. Mahyar Kargar & Benjamin Lester & David Lindsay & Shuo Liu & Pierre-Olivier Weill & Diego Zúñiga, 2021. "Corporate Bond Liquidity during the COVID-19 Crisis [The day coronavirus nearly broke the financial markets]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(11), pages 5352-5401.
    4. Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & Kevin Rageth & René M Stulz, 2021. "How Valuable Is Financial Flexibility when Revenue Stops? Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis [The risk of being a fallen angel and the corporate dash for cash in the midst of COVID]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(11), pages 5474-5521.
    5. Goldstein, Itay & Jiang, Hao & Ng, David T., 2017. "Investor flows and fragility in corporate bond funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(3), pages 592-613.
    6. Sergey Chernenko & Adi Sunderam, 2016. "Liquidity Transformation in Asset Management: Evidence from the Cash Holdings of Mutual Funds," NBER Working Papers 22391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
    8. Chen, Qi & Goldstein, Itay & Jiang, Wei, 2010. "Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: Evidence from mutual fund outflows," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 239-262, August.
    9. Morris, Stephen & Shim, Ilhyock & Shin, Hyun Song, 2017. "Redemption risk and cash hoarding by asset managers," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 71-87.
    10. Coval, Joshua & Stafford, Erik, 2007. "Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 479-512, November.
    11. Chernenko, Sergey & Sunderam, Adi, 2016. "Liquidity Transformation in Asset Management: Evidence form the Cash Holdings of Mutual Funds," Working Paper Series 2016-05, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "The Limits of Arbitrage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 35-55, March.
    13. Chernenko, Sergey & Sunderam, Adi, 2016. "Liquidity transformation in asset management: Evidence from the cash holdings of mutual funds," ESRB Working Paper Series 23, European Systemic Risk Board.
    14. Zeng, Yao, 2017. "A dynamic theory of mutual fund runs and liquidity management," ESRB Working Paper Series 42, European Systemic Risk Board.
    15. Darrell Duffie, 2010. "Presidential Address: Asset Price Dynamics with Slow‐Moving Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(4), pages 1237-1267, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Falato, Antonio & Goldstein, Itay & Hortaçsu, Ali, 2021. "Financial fragility in the COVID-19 crisis: The case of investment funds in corporate bond markets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 35-52.
    2. Valentin Haddad & Alan Moreira & Tyler Muir, 2021. "When Selling Becomes Viral: Disruptions in Debt Markets in the COVID-19 Crisis and the Fed’s Response [Funding value adjustments]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(11), pages 5309-5351.
    3. di Iasio, Giovanni & Kryczka, Dominika, 2021. "Market failures in market-based finance," Working Paper Series 2545, European Central Bank.
    4. Jiang, Hao & Li, Yi & Sun, Zheng & Wang, Ashley, 2022. "Does mutual fund illiquidity introduce fragility into asset prices? Evidence from the corporate bond market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 277-302.
    5. Breckenfelder, Johannes & Hoerova, Marie, 2023. "Do non-banks need access to the lender of last resort? Evidence from fund runs," Working Paper Series 2805, European Central Bank.
    6. Dekker, Lennart, 2024. "Essays on asset liquidity and investment funds," Other publications TiSEM 5fc9bf77-84e7-4a36-9e3a-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Molestina Vivar, Luis & Wedow, Michael & Weistroffer, Christian, 2023. "Burned by leverage? Flows and fragility in bond mutual funds," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 354-380.
    8. Cai, Fang & Han, Song & Li, Dan & Li, Yi, 2019. "Institutional herding and its price impact: Evidence from the corporate bond market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 139-167.
    9. Wang, Z. Jay & Yang, Jingyun, 2021. "Cross-trading and liquidity management: Evidence from municipal bond funds," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    10. Antonio Falato & Ali Hortaçsu & Dan Li & Chaehee Shin, 2021. "Fire‐Sale Spillovers in Debt Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(6), pages 3055-3102, December.
    11. Mathias S. Kruttli & Phillip J. Monin & Lubomir Petrasek & Sumudu W. Watugala, 2021. "Hedge Fund Treasury Trading and Funding Fragility: Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2021-038, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Agostino Capponi & Paul Glasserman & Marko Weber, 2020. "Swing Pricing for Mutual Funds: Breaking the Feedback Loop Between Fire Sales and Fund Redemptions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3581-3602, August.
    13. Milan Szabo, 2022. "Meeting investor outflows in Czech bond and equity funds: horizontal or vertical?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1123-1151, November.
    14. Agostino Capponi & Paul Glasserman & Marko Weber, 2018. "Swing Pricing for Mutual Funds: Breaking the Feedback Loop Between Fire Sales and Fund Runs," Working Papers 18-04, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    15. Goldstein, Itay, 2017. "Comment on “Redemption risk and cash hoarding by asset managers” by Morris, Shim, and Shin," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 88-91.
    16. Chernenko, Sergey & Sunderam, Adi, 2020. "Do fire sales create externalities?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(3), pages 602-628.
    17. Dunhong Jin & Marcin Kacperczyk & Bige Kahraman & Felix Suntheim, 2022. "Swing Pricing and Fragility in Open-End Mutual Funds," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(1), pages 1-50.
    18. Allaire, Nolwenn & Breckenfelder, Johannes & Hoerova, Marie, 2023. "Fund fragility: the role of investor base," Working Paper Series 2874, European Central Bank.
    19. Antoine Baena & Thomas Garcia, 2023. "Swing Pricing et dynamique des flux au regard de la crise Covid-19," Working papers 914, Banque de France.
    20. Aragon, George O. & Kim, Min S., 2023. "Fire sale risk and expected stock returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(3), pages 578-609.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2020-98. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Toni Shears (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mfichus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.