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Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships

Author

Listed:
  • Jennifer Arlen

    (New York University School of Law)

  • Matthew Spitzer

    (none)

  • Eric Talley

    (The Law School, University of Southern California; The RAND Corporation)

Abstract

Behavioral Law and Economics has become an increasingly prominent field within legal scholarship, and most recently within the corporate area. A behavioral bias of particular relevance in corporate contexts is the differential between individuals' willingness to pay to obtain a legal entitlement and her willingness to accept to part with one, known as the "endowment effect." Should endowment effects pervade relationships within business organizations, it would significantly complicate much of the common wisdom within corporate law, such as the presumed optimality of ex ante voluntary agreements. Existing experimental research, however, does not adequately address whether and to what extent the endowment effect operates within corporate environments.This Article presents an experimental test for endowment effects within a principal-agent relationship that typifies many firms. We find that subjects situated in an agency relationship do not exhibit a significant endowment effect. Using an additional experimental test, we argue that this dampening phenomenon is likely due to the fact that the agency context induces subjects to view property rights principally for their exchange value, thereby causing them to "disendow" their initial legal entitlements.

Suggested Citation

  • Jennifer Arlen & Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, "undated". "Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1016, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:bep:yaloln:yale_lepp-1016
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    Cited by:

    1. Jennifer Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, 2015. "Does the Endowment Effect Justify Legal Intervention? The Debiasing Effect of Institutions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 143-182.
    2. Lucy F. Ackert & Bryan K. Church & Gerald P. Dwyer, 2005. "When the shoe is on the other foot: experimental evidence on evaluation disparities," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2005-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    3. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, 2006. "Debiasing through Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 199-242, January.
    4. Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella, 2004. "The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 117-134, October.
    5. Fischer Sven & Goerg Sebastian J. & Hamann Hanjo, 2015. "Cui Bono, Benefit Corporation? An Experiment Inspired by Social Enterprise Legislation in Germany and the US," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 79-110, March.
    6. Christoph Engel & Heike Hennig‐Schmidt & Bernd Irlenbusch & Sebastian Kube, 2015. "On Probation: An Experimental Analysis," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(2), pages 252-288, June.
    7. Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, 2005. "The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 530-545, June.
    8. Christoph Engel & Michael Kurschilgen, 2011. "The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations. Customary Law in the Lab," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_32, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    9. Isabel Marcin & Andreas Nicklisch, 2014. "Testing the Endowment Effect for Default Rules," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_01, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    10. Wüstemann, Jens, 2004. "Evaluation and response to risk in international accounting and audit systems : framework and German experiences," Papers 04-20, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    11. Wüstemann, Jens, 2004. "Evaluation and Response to Risk in International Accounting and Audit Systems: Framework and German Experiences," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-20, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    12. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Property Law," NBER Working Papers 9695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Aviad Heifetz & Ella Segev & Eric Talley, "undated". "Market Design with Endogenous Preferences," University of Southern California Legal Working Paper Series usclwps-1001, University of Southern California Law School.
    14. Roth, Gerrit, 2006. "Predicting the Gap between Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay," Munich Dissertations in Economics 4901, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    15. Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella & Talley, Eric, 2007. "Market design with endogenous preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 121-153, January.

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