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Risk, Insurance, and (the Social Construction of) Responsibility

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  • Tom Baker

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

Insurance, we all know, transfers risk. Yet, what we usually think of as a transfer of risk is also a transfer of responsibility. The promise of insurance and other forms of risk management is gaining a measure of control over an uncertain world. Reaching out to insurance institutions for protection cedes responsibility to them. Thus, risk not only creates responsibility, but also, through the means explored in this chapter, socializes that responsibility. Indeed, if we understand the "embrace of risk" to include the embrace of insurance and other aspects of risk management, then we might wonder whether the embrace of risk is "really" about individual responsibility, and we might think more about social control.

Suggested Citation

  • Tom Baker, "undated". "Risk, Insurance, and (the Social Construction of) Responsibility," University of Connecticut School of Law Working Papers uconn_ucwps-1007, University of Connecticut School of Law.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:conlaw:uconn_ucwps-1007
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    File URL: http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=uconn/ucwps
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Butler, Richard J. & Hartwig, Robert P. & Gardner, Harold, 1997. "HMOs, moral hazard and cost shifting in workers' compensation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 191-206, April.
    2. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    3. Tom Baker, "undated". "Insurance and the Law," University of Connecticut School of Law Working Papers uconn_ucwps-1004, University of Connecticut School of Law.
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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Brinkmann, 2013. "Combining Risk and Responsibility Perspectives: First Steps," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 112(4), pages 567-583, February.
    2. Chloe H. Lucas & Kate I. Booth, 2020. "Privatizing climate adaptation: How insurance weakens solidaristic and collective disaster recovery," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(6), November.
    3. Aaron Doyle, 2011. "Introduction: Insurance and Business Ethics," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 1-5, April.
    4. Turo-Kimmo Lehtonen & Jyri Liukko, 2011. "The Forms and Limits of Insurance Solidarity," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 33-44, April.
    5. Ralf Radermacher & Johannes Brinkmann, 2011. "Insurance for the Poor?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 63-76, April.
    6. Tim Harries, 2012. "The Anticipated Emotional Consequences of Adaptive Behaviour—Impacts on the Take-up of Household Flood-Protection Measures," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 44(3), pages 649-668, March.
    7. Sylvestre Frezal & Laurence Barry, 2020. "Fairness in Uncertainty: Some Limits and Misinterpretations of Actuarial Fairness," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 127-136, November.
    8. Chen-Yu Chang, 2013. "Flood Hazards Jessica Lamond, Colin Booth, Felix Hammond and David Proverbs (eds), CRC Press, London, 2011 387 pp, ISBN 978 1 4398262 5 6, £82.00 (hb)," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 291-296, March.

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