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Policy implications of losing credibility: Lessons from Colombia’s post-pandemic inflationary surge

Author

Listed:
  • Anderson Grajales-Olarte
  • Franz Hamann
  • Sara Naranjo-Saldarriaga
  • José Pulido

Abstract

Inflationary surges, such as those experienced in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, can undermine the credibility of central bank inflation targets. Using data from expectations surveys, we test whether credibility losses occurred in Colombia and assess their magnitude. We then use these estimates to inform a Bayesian estimation of a monetary policy model in which such credibility is endogenous, depending on the central bank’s past performance in achieving its inflation target. We implement our framework embedded in one of the main semi-structural models for monetary policy analysis in the country, the 4GM-model (Gonzalez et al., 2020). Our implementation is designed such that the 4GM specification is nested within our model as a particular case in which the costs of credibility losses are absent. Our findings indicate that the post-pandemic inflationary surge in Colombia represents the episode with the largest credibility loss in recent decades, and such episodes tend to make inflation stabilization policies more costly in terms of output. **** RESUMEN: Brotes inflacionarios como el experimentado tras la pandemia de COVID-19 pueden socavar la credibilidad de las metas de inflación de los bancos centrales. Utilizando datos de encuestas de expectativas, evaluamos si se produjeron pérdidas de credibilidad en Colombia y las cuantificamos. Posteriormente, utilizamos estas estimaciones para informar una estimación bayesiana de un modelo de política monetaria en el que dicha credibilidad es endógena, dependiendo del desempeño pasado del banco central en el cumplimiento de su meta de inflación. Este mecanismo lo implementamos en el principal modelo semiestructural para el análisis de política monetaria en el país, el modelo 4GM (González et al., 2020). Nuestra implementación está diseñada de manera que la especificación del 4GM esté anidada dentro de nuestro modelo como un caso particular en el que los costos de las pérdidas de credibilidad están ausentes. Nuestros hallazgos indican que el brote inflacionario post-pandemia en Colombia representa el episodio con la mayor pérdida de credibilidad en las últimas décadas, y que episodios de este tipo tienden a hacer más costosas las políticas de estabilización de la inflación en términos de producto.

Suggested Citation

  • Anderson Grajales-Olarte & Franz Hamann & Sara Naranjo-Saldarriaga & José Pulido, 2025. "Policy implications of losing credibility: Lessons from Colombia’s post-pandemic inflationary surge," Borradores de Economia 1304, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:1304
    DOI: 10.32468/be.1304
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credibility; expectations; inflation; monetary policy; non-linear; Credibilidad; expectativas; inflación; política monetaria; no linealidad;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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