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El Presupuesto General de la Nación: Una aproximación a las partidas de transferencias e inversión

Author

Listed:
  • Ligia Alba Melo-Becerra

    (Banco de la República de Colombia)

  • Jorge Enrique Ramos-Forero

    (Banco de la República de Colombia)

  • Camilo Gómez

    (Banco de la República de Colombia)

Abstract

Este documento presenta una revisión de la literatura teórica sobre la economía política del presupuesto, describe el proceso presupuestal en Colombia con sus problemas y limitaciones, y explora en detalle los componentes de transferencias y de inversión del Presupuesto General de la Nación (PGN), cuya composición es más compleja de evaluar por la naturaleza y la variedad de sus partidas. Estos dos componentes representan cerca del 60% del PGN y evidencian una gran in exibilidad del gasto público, especialmente en transferencias. La in exibilidad tiene origen en la diversidad de apropiaciones con respaldo legal, que limitan el margen de maniobra de los gobiernos a la hora de formular el presupuesto. La inversión está integrada por una gama amplia de programas sociales y subsidios y por proyectos de infraestructura, que en algunos casos corresponden a compromisos adquiridos en vigencias anteriores, a través de las denominadas vigencias futuras, las cuales también in exibilizan el PGN. La rigidez del PGN se profundiza con la aprobación frecuente de leyes que generan gasto adicional de manera transitoria o permanente. **** ABSTRACT: This paper presents a review of the theoretical literature on the political economy of the government budget, describes the budget process in Colombia with its problems and limitations, and explores in detail the transfer and investment components of the General Budget of the Nation, whose composition is more complex to evaluate due to the nature and variety of its items. These two components represent close to 60% of the budget and show great in exibility of public spending, especially in transfers. The in exibility stems from the diversity of appropriations with legal backing, which limits the margin of maneuver for governments when formulating the budget. The investment is made up of a wide range of social programs, subsidies and infrastructure projects, which in some cases correspond to commitments acquired in previous periods, through so-called "vigencias futuras", which also contribute to the in exibility of the budget. The rigidity of the budget deepens with the frequent approval of laws that generate additional spending on a temporary or permanent basis.

Suggested Citation

  • Ligia Alba Melo-Becerra & Jorge Enrique Ramos-Forero & Camilo Gómez, 2020. "El Presupuesto General de la Nación: Una aproximación a las partidas de transferencias e inversión," Borradores de Economia 1136, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:1136
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.32468/be.1136
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    1. Ligia Alba Melo-Becerra & Jorge Hernán Toro-Córdoba & Héctor M. Zárate-Solano, 2020. "La Inversión en Infraestructura de Transporte," Borradores de Economia 1145, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    2. Jorge Iván Rincón Córdoba, (editor). & Nicolás Cabezas Manosalva, (editor)., 2021. "Derecho Administrativo Sanitario Tomo I. Derecho a la Salud, Salubridad Pública y Condiciones Sanitarias de las Ciudades," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1299.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    gasto público; presupuesto; inversión; transferencias; public expenditure; government budget; investment; transfers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • O24 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy

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