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Representing Roomates' Preferences with Symmetric Utilities

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  • José Álvaro Rodrigues Neto

Abstract

In the context of the stable roommates problem, it is shown that acyclicity of preferences is equivalent to the existence of symmetric utility functions, i.e. the utility of agent i when matched with j is the same as j's utility when matched with i.

Suggested Citation

  • José Álvaro Rodrigues Neto, 2006. "Representing Roomates' Preferences with Symmetric Utilities," Working Papers Series 105, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:bcb:wpaper:105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chung, Kim-Sau, 2000. "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 206-230, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Greg Leo & Jian Lou & Martin Van der Linden & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Matching soulmates," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 822-857, October.
    2. Gudmundsson, Jens, 2011. "On symmetry in the formation of stable partnerships," Working Papers 2011:29, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    3. Pierre-André Chiappori & Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salanié, 2019. "On Human Capital and Team Stability," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 236-259.
    4. Nora Gordon & Brian Knight, 2006. "The Causes of Political Integration: An Application to School Districts," NBER Working Papers 12047, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jaeok Park, 2015. "Competitive Equilibrium and Singleton Cores in Generalized Matching Problems (published in:International Journal of Game Theory, May 2017, Vol.46, Issue2, 487-509)," Working papers 2015rwp-85, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    6. Jaeok Park, 2017. "Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 487-509, May.
    7. Jens Gudmundsson, 2014. "When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(2), pages 151-161, June.
    8. Linde, Sebastian & Siebert, Ralph B., 2023. "Exploring the incremental merger value from multimarket and technology arguments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    9. Rodrigues-Neto, José Alvaro, 2013. "Acyclic roommates," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 304-306.
    10. Gordon, Nora & Knight, Brian, 2009. "A spatial merger estimator with an application to school district consolidation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 752-765, June.
    11. José Luis Contreras & Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, 2021. "The roommate problem with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 149-165, March.
    12. Gudmundsson, Jens, 2013. "A Review of the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Working Papers 2013:8, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    13. Pierre-Andr'e Chiappori & Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "On Human Capital and Team Stability," Papers 2102.06487, arXiv.org.

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