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Evolution and Endogenous Interations

Author

Listed:
  • Mailath, G.J.
  • Samuelson, L.
  • Shaked, A.

Abstract

We examine an evolutionary model with "local interactions," so that some agents may be more likely to interact than others. We show that equilibrium strategy choices with given local interactions correspond to correlated equilibria of the underlying game, suggesting an new interpretation for correlated equilibrium. We then allow the pattern of interactions itself to be shaped by evolutionary pressures. If agents do not have the ability to avoid unwanted interactions, the heterogeneous outcomes can appear, including outcomes in which different groups play different Pareto ranked equilibria. If agents do have the ability to avoid undesired interaction, then we derive conditions under which outcomes must be not only homogeneous but efficient.
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Suggested Citation

  • Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interations," Working papers 9426, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    • Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9426
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. William H. Sandholm, 1998. "History-Independent Prediction In Evolutionary Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(3), pages 303-326, August.
    2. Stephen Morris, 2000. "Contagion," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 57-78.
    3. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0113, Econometric Society.
    4. Giorgio Fagiolo & Luigi Marengo & Marco Valente, 2004. "Endogenous Networks In Random Population Games," Mathematical Population Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 121-147.
    5. Giorgio Fagiolo, 2001. "Coordination, Local Interactions and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation," LEM Papers Series 2001/15, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    6. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
    7. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1998. "Teaching Agent-Based Computational Economics to Graduate Students," ISU General Staff Papers 199807010700001043, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    8. Leigh S. Tesfatsion, "undated". "An Evolutionary Trade Network Game with Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _057, Society for Computational Economics.
    9. Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath, 1997. "Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(3), pages 551-556.
    10. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1995. "A Trade Network Game with Endogenous Partner Selection," ISU General Staff Papers 199505010700001034, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    11. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, 2000. "Non-Market Interactions," NBER Working Papers 8053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "How Economists Can Get Alife," Economic Report 37, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
    13. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1998. "Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game," ISU General Staff Papers 199804010800001041, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    14. Esther Hauk, "undated". "Leaving the Prison: A Discussion of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _067, Society for Computational Economics.
    15. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1997. "Unfolding social hierarchies in large population games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    16. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Individual learning and social rationality1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 651-663, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory ; economic equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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