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Profit Maximization, Industry Structure, and Competition: A critique of neoclassical theory

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  • Steve Keen
  • Russell K. Standish

Abstract

Neoclassical economics has two theories of competition between profit-maximizing firms (Marshallian and Cournot-Nash) that start from different premises about the degree of strategic interaction between firms, yet reach the same result, that market price falls as the number of firms in an industry increases. The Marshallian argument is strictly false. We integrate the different premises, and establish that the optimal level of strategic interaction between competing firms is zero. Simulations support our analysis and reveal intriguing emergent behaviors.

Suggested Citation

  • Steve Keen & Russell K. Standish, 2006. "Profit Maximization, Industry Structure, and Competition: A critique of neoclassical theory," Papers nlin/0604061, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:nlin/0604061
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Keen, Steve, 2004. "Deregulator: Judgment Day for microeconomics," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 109-125, September.
    2. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
    3. G. J. Stigler, 1972. "Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Charles K. Rowley (ed.), Readings in Industrial Economics, chapter 7, pages 105-130, Palgrave Macmillan.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fix, Blair, 2020. "Economic Development and the Death of the Free Market," Working Papers on Capital as Power 2020/01, Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism.
    2. David Rosnick, 2015. "Toward an Understanding of Keen and Standish's Theory of the Firm: A Comment," World Economic Review, World Economics Association, vol. 2015(5), pages 107-107, July.
    3. Anglin, Paul, 2008. "On the proper behavior of atoms: A comment on a critique," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(1), pages 277-280.
    4. Fix, Blair, 2020. "Economic Development and the Death of the Free Market," SocArXiv g86am, Center for Open Science.
    5. Dariusz Klimek & Elżbieta Jędrych, 2020. "A Model for the Sustainable Management of Enterprise Capital," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-13, December.
    6. Segismundo S. Izquierdo & Luis R. Izquierdo, 2015. "The “Win-Continue, Lose-Reverse” Rule In Oligopolies: Robustness Of Collusive Outcomes," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(05n06), pages 1-23, August.
    7. Barreira da Silva Rocha, André, 2013. "Evolutionary dynamics of nationalism and migration," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(15), pages 3183-3197.
    8. Bell, William Paul, 2009. "Adaptive interactive expectations: dynamically modelling profit expectations," MPRA Paper 38260, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Feb 2010.
    9. Promit Kanti Chaudhuri, 2021. "Strategic inattention and divisionalization in duopoly," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2021-020, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    10. Elżbieta Jędrych & Dariusz Klimek & Agnieszka Rzepka, 2021. "Principles of Sustainable Management of Energy Companies: The Case of Poland," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(8), pages 1-18, April.
    11. Russell K. Standish & Stephen L. Keen, 2015. "Rationality in the Theory of the Firm," World Economic Review, World Economics Association, vol. 2015(5), pages 101-101, July.
    12. Blair Fix, 2022. "Economic development and the death of the free market," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-46, April.
    13. Gerasimos T. Soldatos, 2021. "A model of market competition as a prize contest or a model of strife for market domination," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-9, January.
    14. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca & Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., 2020. "Strategic inattention, delegation and endogenous market structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).

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