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Inequality Sensitive Optimal Treatment Assignment

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  • Eduardo Zambrano

Abstract

The egalitarian equivalent, $ee$, of a societal distribution of outcomes with mean $m$ is the outcome level such that the evaluator is indifferent between the distribution of outcomes and a society in which everyone obtains an outcome of $ee$. For an inequality averse evaluator, $ee

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  • Eduardo Zambrano, 2024. "Inequality Sensitive Optimal Treatment Assignment," Papers 2409.14776, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2409.14776
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yingqi Zhao & Donglin Zeng & A. John Rush & Michael R. Kosorok, 2012. "Estimating Individualized Treatment Rules Using Outcome Weighted Learning," Journal of the American Statistical Association, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 107(499), pages 1106-1118, September.
    2. Xuan Chen & Carlos A. Flores, 2015. "Bounds on Treatment Effects in the Presence of Sample Selection and Noncompliance: The Wage Effects of Job Corps," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(4), pages 523-540, October.
    3. Marc Fleurbaey, 2010. "Assessing Risky Social Situations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(4), pages 649-680, August.
    4. Tetenov, Aleksey, 2012. "Statistical treatment choice based on asymmetric minimax regret criteria," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 166(1), pages 157-165.
    5. Manski, Charles F., 2000. "Identification problems and decisions under ambiguity: Empirical analysis of treatment response and normative analysis of treatment choice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 415-442, April.
    6. Rachael Meager, 2019. "Understanding the Average Impact of Microcredit Expansions: A Bayesian Hierarchical Analysis of Seven Randomized Experiments," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 57-91, January.
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