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Fair Combinatorial Auction for Blockchain Trade Intents: Being Fair without Knowing What is Fair

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  • Andrea Canidio
  • Felix Henneke

Abstract

Blockchain trade intent auctions currently intermediate approximately USD 5 billion monthly. Due to production complementarities, the auction is combinatorial: when multiple trade intents from different traders are auctioned off simultaneously, a bidder (here called solver) can generate additional efficiencies by winning a batch of multiple trade intents. However, sharing these additional efficiencies between traders is problematic: because of market frictions and fees (solvers' private information), the auctioneer does not know how much each trader would have received had its trade been auctioned off individually. We formalize this problem and study the most commonly used auction formats: batch auctions and multiple simultaneous auctions. We also propose a novel fair combinatorial auction that combines batch auction and multiple simultaneous auctions: solvers submit individual-trade bids and batched bids, but batched bids are considered only if they are better for all traders relative to the outcome of the simultaneous auctions constructed using the individual-trade bids. We find a trade-off between the fairness guarantees provided in equilibrium by the auction (i.e., the minimum each trader can expect to receive) and the expected value of the assets returned to the traders. Also, the amount that each trader receives in the equilibrium of the fair combinatorial auction may be higher or lower than what they receive in the equilibrium of the simultaneous auctions used as a benchmark for fairness.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Canidio & Felix Henneke, 2024. "Fair Combinatorial Auction for Blockchain Trade Intents: Being Fair without Knowing What is Fair," Papers 2408.12225, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2408.12225
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    References listed on IDEAS

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