No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017.
"An invitation to market design,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
- Scott Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent Crawford, 2017. "An Invitation to Market Design," Working Papers 2017-069, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Chao Huang, 2021. "Stable matching: an integer programming approach," Papers 2103.03418, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
- Brandt, Felix & Saile, Christian & Stricker, Christian, 2022. "Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
- Grenet, Julien & He, YingHua & Kübler, Dorothea, 2022.
"Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms,"
EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 130(6), pages 1-1.
- Julien Grenet & YingHua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(6), pages 1427-1476.
- Julien Grenet & Yinghua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," Post-Print halshs-03761513, HAL.
- Julien Grenet & Yinghua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," Working Papers halshs-02146792, HAL.
- Julien Grenet & Yinghua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," PSE Working Papers halshs-02146792, HAL.
- Julien Grenet & Yinghua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03761513, HAL.
- Ivan Balbuzanov & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2019.
"Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1663-1692, September.
- Balbuzanov, Ivan & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2017. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange," Working Paper Series rwp17-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2006.
"Efficient priority rules,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 372-384, May.
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2002. "Efficient Priority Rules," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 554.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2003. "Efficient Priority Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2003-13, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2003. "Efficient Priority Rules," Cahiers de recherche 11-2003, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Efficient Priority Rules," Working Papers 103, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Miralles, Antonio & Pycia, Marek, 2021.
"Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
- Pycia, Marek & Miralles, Antonio, 2020. "Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 15161, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Antonio Miralles & Marek Pycia, 2021. "Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources," ECON - Working Papers 385, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003.
"Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
- EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2001. "Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Ehlers, L. & Klaus, B., 2001. "Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2015. "Size versus fairness in the assignment problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 119-127.
- Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005.
"House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 153-185, July.
- Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2001. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence," Game Theory and Information 0112002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2004.
- repec:cty:dpaper:10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.009 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yasunori Okumura, 2024. "Strategic Analysis of Fair Rank-Minimizing Mechanisms with Agent Refusal Option," Papers 2408.01673, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2024.
"Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 77-102.
- Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo Saulle, 2022. "Designing Rotation Programs: Limits and Possibilities," Working Papers 202221, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005.
"Pairwise kidney exchange,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," NBER Working Papers 10698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sönmez, Tayfun & Utku Ünver, M. & Roth, Alvin E., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Scholarly Articles 32072400, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0408001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Feb 2005.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 620, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Felix Brandt & Patrick Lederer & Warut Suksompong, 2022. "Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences," Papers 2204.12436, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
- Bettina Klaus & David F. Manlove & Francesca Rossi, 2014. "Matching under Preferences," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 14.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Diebold, Franz & Bichler, Martin, 2017. "Matching with indifferences: A comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(1), pages 268-282.
- Yusuke Narita, 2018. "Toward an Ethical Experiment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2127, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Eric van Damme & Xu Lang, 2022. "Two-Person Bargaining when the Disagreement Point is Private Information," Papers 2211.06830, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
- Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023.
"A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
- Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Pycia, Marek & Troyan, Peter, 2022. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 14043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eun Jeong Heo & Vikram Manjunath, 2017. "Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 5-30, January.
More about this item
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-09-30 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2024-09-30 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2408.10077. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.