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Games with Planned Actions and Scouting

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  • Wolfgang Kuhle

Abstract

We study games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Moreover, before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information that they receive on their adversary's preparations. In turn, we examine how players' information over each others' planned actions influences winning odds in matching pennies games, and how it incentivises the use of decoys, deception, and camouflage. Across scenarios, we emphasize that the decomposition of an action into (i) a preparation to act and (ii) the execution of the action, allows to analyze one-shot simultaneous-move games, where players partially observe each others' contemporaneous actions.

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  • Wolfgang Kuhle, 2024. "Games with Planned Actions and Scouting," Papers 2408.09778, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2408.09778
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    References listed on IDEAS

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