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CLVR Ordering of Transactions on AMMs

Author

Listed:
  • Robert McLaughlin
  • Nir Chemaya
  • Dingyue Liu
  • Dahlia Malkhi

Abstract

Trading on decentralized exchanges via an Automated Market Maker (AMM) mechanism has been massively adopted, with a daily trading volume reaching $1B. This trading method has also received close attention from researchers, central banks, and financial firms, who have the potential to adopt it to traditional financial markets such as foreign exchanges and stock markets. A critical challenge of AMM-powered trading is that transaction order has high financial value, so a policy or method to order transactions in a "good" (optimal) manner is vital. We offer economic measures of both price stability (low volatility) and inequality that inform how a "social planner" should pick an optimal ordering. We show that there is a trade-off between achieving price stability and reducing inequality, and that policymakers must choose which to prioritize. In addition, picking the optimal order can often be costly, especially when performing an exhaustive search over trade orderings (permutations). As an alternative we provide a simple algorithm, Clever Look-ahead Volatility Reduction (CLVR). This algorithm constructs an ordering which approximately minimizes price volatility with a small computation cost. We also provide insight into the strategy changes that may occur if traders are subject to this sequencing algorithm.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert McLaughlin & Nir Chemaya & Dingyue Liu & Dahlia Malkhi, 2024. "CLVR Ordering of Transactions on AMMs," Papers 2408.02634, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2408.02634
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Budish & Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, 2024. "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(4), pages 1209-1246.
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    3. Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & John Shim, 2015. "Editor's Choice The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(4), pages 1547-1621.
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