IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2402.11881.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ironing allocations

Author

Listed:
  • Filip Tokarski

Abstract

I propose a new approach to solving standard screening problems when the monotonicity constraint binds. A simple geometric argument shows that when virtual values are quasi-concave, the optimal allocation can be found by appropriately truncating the solution to the relaxed problem. I provide a simple algorithm for finding this optimal truncation when virtual values are concave.

Suggested Citation

  • Filip Tokarski, 2024. "Ironing allocations," Papers 2402.11881, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2402.11881
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.11881
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Toikka, Juuso, 2011. "Ironing without control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2510-2526.
    2. Martin Hellwig, 2008. "A Maximum Principle for Control Problems with Monotonicity Constraints," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    3. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Artyom Shneyerov, 2014. "An optimal slow Dutch auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 577-602, November.
    2. Ostrizek, Franz & Sartori, Elia, 2023. "Screening while controlling an externality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 26-55.
    3. Gerardi, Dino & Hörner, Johannes & Maestri, Lucas, 2014. "The role of commitment in bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 578-603.
    4. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018. "On asymmetric reserve prices," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    5. Li, Yunan, 2019. "Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 279-328.
    6. Cui, Zhenyu & Lee, Chihoon & Zhu, Lingjiong & Zhu, Yunfan, 2021. "Non-convex isotonic regression via the Myersonian approach," Statistics & Probability Letters, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    7. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mengxi Zhang, 2021. "A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(4), pages 1011-1051.
    8. Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 1284-1320.
    9. Sun, Wuqin & Wang, Dazhong & Zhang, Yue, 2018. "Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 57-66.
    10. Yingkai Li, 2021. "Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information," Papers 2103.05788, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    11. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2018. "The Design and Price of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(1), pages 1-48, January.
    12. Alejandro Francetich, 2023. "When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 363-399, June.
    13. Jetlir Duraj, 2018. "Mechanism Design with News Utility," Papers 1808.04020, arXiv.org.
    14. Zheng, Mingli & Wang, Chong & Li, Chaozheng, 2015. "Optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 60-66.
    15. Yunan Li, 2017. "Efficient Mechanisms with Information Acquisition," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Jun 2017.
    16. Tóbiás, Áron, 2018. "Non-linear pricing and optimal shipping policies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 194-218.
    17. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1557-1593, July.
    18. Dirk Bergemann & Yang Cai & Grigoris Velegkas & Mingfei Zhao, 2022. "Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2324, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    19. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2014. "Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1952, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    20. Castro-Pires, Henrique & Moreira, Humberto, 2021. "Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 73-103.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2402.11881. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.