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Expiring Assets in Automated Market Makers

Author

Listed:
  • Kenan Wood
  • Maurice Herlihy
  • Hammurabi Mendes
  • Jonad Pulaj

Abstract

An automated market maker (AMM) is a state machine that manages pools of assets, allowing parties to buy and sell those assets according to a fixed mathematical formula. AMMs are typically implemented as smart contracts on blockchains, and its prices are kept in line with the overall market price by arbitrage: if the AMM undervalues an asset with respect to the market, an "arbitrageur" can make a risk-free profit by buying just enough of that asset to bring the AMM's price back in line with the market. AMMs, however, are not designed for assets that expire: that is, assets that cannot be produced or resold after a specified date. As assets approach expiration, arbitrage may not be able to reconcile supply and demand, and the liquidity providers that funded the AMM may have excessive exposure to risk due to rapid price variations. This paper formally describes the design of a decentralized exchange (DEX) for assets that expire, combining aspects of AMMs and limit-order books. We ensure liveness and market clearance, providing mechanisms for liquidity providers to control their exposure to risk and adjust prices dynamically in response to situations where arbitrage may fail.

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  • Kenan Wood & Maurice Herlihy & Hammurabi Mendes & Jonad Pulaj, 2024. "Expiring Assets in Automated Market Makers," Papers 2401.04289, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2401.04289
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jiahua Xu & Krzysztof Paruch & Simon Cousaert & Yebo Feng, 2021. "SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) Protocols," Papers 2103.12732, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    2. Maxim Bichuch & Zachary Feinstein, 2022. "Axioms for Automated Market Makers: A Mathematical Framework in FinTech and Decentralized Finance," Papers 2210.01227, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
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