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No Ascending Auction can find Equilibrium for SubModular valuations

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  • Oren Ben-Zwi
  • Ilan Newman

Abstract

We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free price vector if all valuations are submodular, assuming a basic complexity theory's assumption.

Suggested Citation

  • Oren Ben-Zwi & Ilan Newman, 2023. "No Ascending Auction can find Equilibrium for SubModular valuations," Papers 2312.00522, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2312.00522
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Blumrosen, Liad & Nisan, Noam, 2010. "Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1203-1223, May.
    2. Paes Leme, Renato, 2017. "Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 294-316.
    3. Gul, Faruk & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2000. "The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 66-95, May.
    4. Lehmann, Benny & Lehmann, Daniel & Nisan, Noam, 2006. "Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 270-296, May.
    5. Ben-Zwi, Oren, 2017. "Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 456-467.
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