Report NEP-MIC-2023-05-22

This is the archive for NEP-MIC, a report on new working papers in the area of Microeconomics. Jing-Yuan Chiou issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-MIC

The following items were announced in this report:

• Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2023. "Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_256v3, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Matteo Escud'e, 2023. "Covert learning and disclosure," Papers 2304.02989, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
• Miguel Risco, 2023. "Network Effects on Information Acquisition by DeGroot Updaters," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_420, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Ostrovsky, Michael & Skrzypacz, Andy, 2022. "Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction," Research Papers 4043, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
• Daniel M A Barreto & Alexis Ghersengorin & Victor Augias, 2022. "Price Discrimination with Redistributive Concerns," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-04067226, HAL.
• Bimpikis, Kostas & Morgenstern, Ilan & Saban, Daniela, 2022. "Data Tracking under Competition," Research Papers 4061, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
• Pinaki Mandal, 2023. "Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness with single-peaked preferences on trees," Papers 2304.11494, arXiv.org.
• Gérard Mondello, 2022. "Information Source's Reliability," GREDEG Working Papers 2022-21, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Oct 2022.
• V. V. Chari & Rishabh Kirpalani & Luis Perez, 2023. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Equilibria with Pandemics," Staff Report 644, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
• Aviad Heifetz & Enrico Minelli & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2023. "Affective Interdependence and Welfare," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2360, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
• Awad, Emiel & Minaudier, Clement, 2023. "Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections," SocArXiv 8z4ax, Center for Open Science.
• Victor Augias & Daniel M A Barreto, 2022. "Persuading a Wishful Thinker," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-04066849, HAL.
• Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2023. "The structure of strategy-proof rules," Papers 2304.12843, arXiv.org.
• Ziwei Wang & Jiabin Wu, 2023. "Partner Choice and Morality: Preference Evolution under Stable Matching," Papers 2304.11504, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
• Giulio Bottazzi & Daniele Giachini & Matteo Ottaviani, 2023. "Market selection and learning under model misspecification," LEM Papers Series 2023/18, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
• Ana Mauleon & Simon Schopohl & Akylai Taalaibekova & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2022. "Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-04085258, HAL.
• Foarta, Dana & Ting, Michael M., 2023. "Organizational Capacity and Project Dynamics," Research Papers 4069, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.