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Critical Thinking Via Storytelling: Theory and Social Media Experiment

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  • Brian Jabarian
  • Elia Sartori

Abstract

In a stylized voting model, we establish that increasing the share of critical thinkers -- individuals who are aware of the ambivalent nature of a certain issue -- in the population increases the efficiency of surveys (elections) but might increase surveys' bias. In an incentivized online social media experiment on a representative US population (N = 706), we show that different digital storytelling formats -- different designs to present the same set of facts -- affect the intensity at which individuals become critical thinkers. Intermediate-length designs (Facebook posts) are most effective at triggering individuals into critical thinking. Individuals with a high need for cognition mostly drive the differential effects of the treatments.

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  • Brian Jabarian & Elia Sartori, 2023. "Critical Thinking Via Storytelling: Theory and Social Media Experiment," Papers 2303.16422, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2303.16422
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    2. B. Douglas Bernheim & Luca Braghieri & Alejandro Martínez-Marquina & David Zuckerman, 2021. "A Theory of Chosen Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(2), pages 720-754, February.
    3. John A. List, 2022. "Enhancing critical thinking skill formation: Getting fast thinkers to slow down," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(1), pages 100-108, January.
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