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Ranked Choice Bedlam in a 2022 Oakland School Director Election

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  • David McCune

Abstract

The November 2022 ranked choice election for District 4 School Director in Oakland, CA, was very interesting from the perspective of social choice theory. The election did not contain a Condorcet winner and exhibited downward and upward monotonicity paradoxes, for example. Furthermore, an error in the settings of the ranked choice tabulation software led to the wrong candidate being declared the winner. This article explores the strange features of this election and places it in the broader context of ranked choice elections in the United States.

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  • David McCune, 2023. "Ranked Choice Bedlam in a 2022 Oakland School Director Election," Papers 2303.05985, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2303.05985
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James Green-Armytage, 2014. "Strategic voting and nomination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 111-138, January.
    2. Nicholas R. Miller, 2017. "Closeness matters: monotonicity failure in IRV elections with three candidates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 91-108, October.
    3. David McCune & Lori McCune, 2021. "The Curious Case of the 2021 Minneapolis Ward 2 City Council Election," Papers 2111.09846, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
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    Cited by:

    1. David McCune & Adam Graham-Squire, 2024. "Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(1), pages 69-101, August.

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