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Paradoxical Oddities in Two Multiwinner Elections from Scotland

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  • Adam Graham-Squire
  • David McCune

Abstract

Ranked-choice voting anomalies such as monotonicity paradoxes have been extensively studied through creating hypothetical examples and generating elections under various models of voter behavior. However, very few real-world examples of such voting paradoxes have been found and analyzed. We investigate two single-transferable vote elections from Scotland that demonstrate upward monotonicity, downward monotonicity, no-show, and committee size paradoxes. These paradoxes are rarely observed in real-world elections, and this article is the first case study of such paradoxes in multiwinner elections.

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  • Adam Graham-Squire & David McCune, 2023. "Paradoxical Oddities in Two Multiwinner Elections from Scotland," Papers 2305.20078, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2305.20078
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    References listed on IDEAS

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