IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2201.10115.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Effects of Privacy-Inducing Noise on Welfare and Influence of Referendum Systems

Author

Listed:
  • Suat Evren
  • Praneeth Vepakomma

Abstract

Social choice functions help aggregate individual preferences while differentially private mechanisms provide formal privacy guarantees to release answers of queries operating on sensitive data. However, preserving differential privacy requires introducing noise to the system, and therefore may lead to undesired byproducts. Does an increase in the level of differential privacy for releasing the outputs of social choice functions increase or decrease the level of influence and welfare, and at what rate? In this paper, we mainly address this question in more precise terms in a referendum setting with two candidates when the celebrated randomized response mechanism is used. We show that there is an inversely-proportional relation between welfare and privacy, and also influence and privacy.

Suggested Citation

  • Suat Evren & Praneeth Vepakomma, 2022. "Effects of Privacy-Inducing Noise on Welfare and Influence of Referendum Systems," Papers 2201.10115, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2201.10115
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2201.10115
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
    2. Claude Hillinger, 2005. "The Case for Utilitarian Voting," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 23, pages 295-321.
    3. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alexia Gaudeul, 2009. "A (Micro) Course in Microeconomic Theory for MSc Students," Working Papers id:1986, eSocialSciences.
    2. Donaldson, Jason & Piacentino, Giorgia & Malenko, Nadya, 2017. "Deadlock on the Board," CEPR Discussion Papers 12503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Freixas, Josep & Parker, Cameron, 2015. "Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 144-151.
    4. Stensholt, Eivind, 2020. "Anomalies of Instant Runoff Voting," Discussion Papers 2020/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    5. António Osório, 2020. "Performance Evaluation: Subjectivity, Bias and Judgment Style in Sport," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 655-678, August.
    6. Maurice Salles, 2006. "La théorie du choix social : de l'importance des mathématiques," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 200617, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    7. Kotaro Suzumura, 2002. "Introduction to social choice and welfare," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 442, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    8. Stensholt, Eivind, 2019. "MMP-elections and the assembly size," Discussion Papers 2019/15, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    9. Harless, Patrick & Phan, William, 2022. "Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 73-89.
    10. L'aszl'o Csat'o, 2019. "Journal ranking should depend on the level of aggregation," Papers 1904.06300, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2019.
    11. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2015. "Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 42-45.
    12. Schnakenberg, Keith E., 2015. "Expert advice to a voting body," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 102-113.
    13. Dotti, Valerio, 2014. "Generalized Comparative Statics for Political Economy Models," MPRA Paper 60711, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
    15. Eivind Stensholt, 2013. "What shall we do with the cyclic profile?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 229-262, January.
    16. António Osório, 2017. "Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 253(1), pages 501-518, June.
    17. Qiaoming Han & Donglei Du & Dachuan Xu & Yicheng Xu, 2018. "Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 859-873, April.
    18. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2009. "Fully sincere voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 720-735, November.
    19. Trent J. MacDonald, 2019. "The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18871.
    20. Davide Grossi, 2021. "Lecture Notes on Voting Theory," Papers 2105.00216, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2201.10115. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.