Marketing resource allocation in duopolies over social networks
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2020-12-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2020-12-14 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2020-12-14 (Network Economics)
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