Intensinist Social Welfare and Ordinal Intensity-Efficient Allocations
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2020-11-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2020-11-23 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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