IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2005.10038.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Coopetition Against an Amazon

Author

Listed:
  • Ronen Gradwohl
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

Abstract

This paper studies cooperative data-sharing between competitors vying to predict a consumer's tastes. We design optimal data-sharing schemes both for when they compete only with each other, and for when they additionally compete with an Amazon -- a company with more, better data. We show that simple schemes -- threshold rules that probabilistically induce either full data-sharing between competitors, or the full transfer of data from one competitor to another -- are either optimal or approximately optimal, depending on properties of the information structure. We also provide conditions under which firms share more data when they face stronger outside competition, and describe situations in which this conclusion is reversed.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronen Gradwohl & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2020. "Coopetition Against an Amazon," Papers 2005.10038, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2005.10038
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.10038
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2019. "Markets for Information: An Introduction," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 85-107, August.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    4. Raith, Michael, 1996. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 260-288, October.
    5. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    6. Richard N. Clarke, 1983. "Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 383-394, Autumn.
    7. Bouncken, Ricarda B. & Kraus, Sascha, 2013. "Innovation in knowledge-intensive industries: The double-edged sword of coopetition," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(10), pages 2060-2070.
    8. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    9. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1821rrr is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Michael Kearns & Mallesh M. Pai & Aaron Roth & Jonathan Ullman, 2014. "Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 431-435, May.
    11. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-1385, November.
    12. Noam Shamir & Hyoduk Shin, 2016. "Public Forecast Information Sharing in a Market with Competing Supply Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(10), pages 2994-3022, October.
    13. Carlos Devece & D. Enrique Ribeiro-Soriano & Daniel Palacios-Marqués, 2019. "Coopetition as the new trend in inter-firm alliances: literature review and research patterns," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 207-226, April.
    14. Albert Y. Ha & Shilu Tong, 2008. "Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(4), pages 701-715, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ronen Gradwohl & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2023. "Selling Data to a Competitor (Extended Abstract)," Papers 2307.05078, arXiv.org.
    2. Mekonnen, Teddy & Leal Vizcaíno, René, 2022. "Bayesian comparative statics," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
    3. Ronen Gradwohl & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2023. "Selling Data to a Competitor," Papers 2302.00285, arXiv.org.
    4. Eduardo Perez‐Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1109-1142, May.
    5. Kostas Bimpikis & Davide Crapis & Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, 2019. "Information Sale and Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 2646-2664, June.
    6. Ian Ball, 2019. "Scoring Strategic Agents," Papers 1909.01888, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    7. Ronen Gradwohl & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2022. "Pareto-Improving Data-Sharing," Papers 2205.11295, arXiv.org.
    8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    9. Miltiadis Makris & Ludovic Renou, 2018. "Information design in multi-stage games," Working Papers 861, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    10. Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    12. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2019. "Partial Language Competence," Working Papers hal-03393108, HAL.
    13. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
      • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    14. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2015. "Information and volatility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 427-465.
    15. Guinsburg, Pedro, 2024. "Information design and sensitivity to market fundamentals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 72-85.
    16. Asriyan, Vladimir & Fuchs, William & Green, Brett, 2021. "Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    17. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Bonatti, Alessandro & Dahleh, Munther & Horel, Thibaut & Nouripour, Amir, 2024. "Selling information in competitive environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    19. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    20. Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun, 2024. "Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 54-65.
    21. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," Post-Print hal-03700394, HAL.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2005.10038. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.