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Costly Attention and Retirement

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  • Jamie Hentall MacCuish

Abstract

Most people are mistaken about the details of their pensions. Mistaken beliefs about financially important policies imply significant informational frictions. This paper incorporates informational friction, specifically a cost of attention to an uncertain pension policy, into a life-cycle model of retirement. This entails solving a dynamic rational inattention model with endogenous heterogeneous beliefs: a significant methodological contribution in itself. Resulting endogenous mistaken beliefs help explain a puzzle, namely labour market exits concentrate at official retirement ages despite weak incentives to do so. The context of the study is the UK female state pension age (SPA) reform. I find most women are mistaken about their SPA, mistakes are predictive of behaviour, and mistakes decrease with age. I estimate the model using simulated method of moments. Costly attention significantly improves model predictions of the labour supply response to the SPA whilst accommodating the observed learning about the individual's SPA. An extension addresses another retirement puzzle, the extremely low take-up of actuarially advantageous deferral options. Introducing costly attention into a model with claiming significantly increase the number of people claiming early when the option to defer appears actuarially advantageous.

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  • Jamie Hentall MacCuish, 2019. "Costly Attention and Retirement," Papers 1904.06520, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1904.06520
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Caplin & Eungik Lee & Søren Leth-Petersen & Johan Sæverud, 2022. "Communicating Social Security Reform," NBER Working Papers 30645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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