IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/1810.01310.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The logic of uncertainty as a logic of experience and chance and the co~event-based Bayes' theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Oleg Yu Vorobyev

Abstract

The logic of uncertainty is not the logic of experience and as well as it is not the logic of chance. It is the logic of experience and chance. Experience and chance are two inseparable poles. These are two dual reflections of one essence, which is called co~event. The theory of experience and chance is the theory of co~events. To study the co~events, it is not enough to study the experience and to study the chance. For this, it is necessary to study the experience and chance as a single entire, a co~event. In other words, it is necessary to study their interaction within a co~event. The new co~event axiomatics and the theory of co~events following from it were created precisely for these purposes. In this work, I am going to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new theory of co~events in a studying the logic of uncertainty. I will do this by the example of a co~event splitting of the logic of the Bayesian scheme, which has a long history of fierce debates between Bayesianists and frequentists. I hope the logic of the theory of experience and chance will make its modest contribution to the application of these old dual debaters.

Suggested Citation

  • Oleg Yu Vorobyev, 2018. "The logic of uncertainty as a logic of experience and chance and the co~event-based Bayes' theorem," Papers 1810.01310, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1810.01310
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.01310
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vorobyev, Oleg Yu., 2016. "An element-set labelling a Cartesian product by measurable binary relations which leads to postulates of the theory of experience and chance as a theory of co~events," MPRA Paper 81891, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Ramsey, Frank P., 1926. "Truth and Probability," Histoy of Economic Thought Chapters, in: Braithwaite, R. B. (ed.),The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, chapter 7, pages 156-198, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler, 2019. "What are axiomatizations good for?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 339-359, May.
    2. Chateauneuf, Alain & Eichberger, Jurgen & Grant, Simon, 2007. "Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 538-567, November.
    3. Jean Baccelli & Philippe Mongin, 2016. "Choice-based cardinal utility: a tribute to Patrick Suppes," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 268-288, July.
    4. Panagiotidis, Theodore & Printzis, Panagiotis, 2020. "What is the investment loss due to uncertainty?," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 45(C).
    5. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2015. "In Praise of Frank Ramsey's Contribution to the Theory of Taxation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 0(583), pages 235-268, March.
    6. Marcello Basili, 2006. "A Rational Decision Rule with Extreme Events," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(6), pages 1721-1728, December.
    7. Adrian C. Darnell, 1994. "A Dictionary Of Econometrics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 118.
    8. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Rasocha, Vlastimil, 2021. "Experimental methods: Eliciting beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 234-256.
    9. Cristina Lidia MANEA, 2016. "Financial products as alternatives to traditional deposits," The Audit Financiar journal, Chamber of Financial Auditors of Romania, vol. 14(137), pages 526-526, April.
    10. Victor Aguirregabiria, 2021. "Identification of firms’ beliefs in structural models of market competition," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 5-33, February.
    11. Pope, Robin & Selten, Reinhard, 2009. "Risk in a Simple Temporal Framework for Expected Utility Theory and for SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 27/2009, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    12. Feduzi, Alberto & Runde, Jochen, 2014. "Uncovering unknown unknowns: Towards a Baconian approach to management decision-making," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 268-283.
    13. Richard Bradley, 2003. "Axiomatic Bayesian Utilitarianism," Working Papers hal-00242956, HAL.
    14. Gabriel Frahm, 2015. "A theoretical foundation of portfolio resampling," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 107-132, July.
    15. Knowles, Glenn J., 1980. "Estimating Utility Functions," Risk Analysis in Agriculture: Research and Educational Developments, January 16-18, 1980, Tucson, Arizona 271570, Regional Research Projects > W-149: An Economic Evaluation of Managing Market Risks in Agriculture.
    16. Berrada, Tony & Detemple, Jérôme & Rindisbacher, Marcel, 2018. "Asset pricing with beliefs-dependent risk aversion and learning," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(3), pages 504-534.
    17. Bethany J. Weber & Wah Pheow Tan, 2012. "Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg Paradox," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 7(4), pages 383-389, July.
    18. Ralph L. Keeney, 2013. "Foundations for Group Decision Analysis," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 10(2), pages 103-120, June.
    19. John Douard, 1996. "Is Risk Neutrality Rational?," Medical Decision Making, , vol. 16(1), pages 10-11, February.
    20. Shira Elqayam & David Over, 2012. "Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: the paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 11(1), pages 27-40, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1810.01310. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.