A Mean Field Competition
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- Marcel Nutz & Jaime San Martin & Xiaowei Tan, 2018. "Convergence to the Mean Field Game Limit: A Case Study," Papers 1806.00817, arXiv.org, revised May 2019.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2017-08-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2017-08-13 (Game Theory)
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