IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/0706.0664.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rent seeking games with tax evasion

Author

Listed:
  • O. Bundau
  • M. Neamtu
  • D. Opris

Abstract

We consider the static and dynamic models of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion. In the dynamic model we introduce the time delay and we analyze the local stability of the stationary state. There is a critical value of the delay when the Hopf bifurcation occurs.

Suggested Citation

  • O. Bundau & M. Neamtu & D. Opris, 2007. "Rent seeking games with tax evasion," Papers 0706.0664, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:0706.0664
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/0706.0664
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kent Matthews & Jean Lloyd-Williams, 2001. "The VAT-Evading Firm and VAT Evasion: An Empirical Analysis," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 39-49.
    2. Lin Xu & Ferenc Szidarovszky, 1999. "The Stability Of Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(01), pages 87-102.
    3. Gordon, Roger H. & Bo Nielsen, Soren, 1997. "Tax evasion in an open economy:: Value-added vs. income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 173-197, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Raul Villafuerte-Segura & Eduardo Alvarado-Santos & Benjamin A. Itza-Ortiz, 2019. "Conditions for stable equilibrium in Cournot duopoly models with tax evasion and time delay," Papers 1905.02817, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2019.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Antonio Gómez Gómez-Plana & Pedro Pascual Arzoz, 2011. "Fraude fiscal e IVA en España: incidencia en un modelo de equilibrio general," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 199(4), pages 9-52, December.
    2. Lin, Shuanglin, 2008. "China's value-added tax reform, capital accumulation, and welfare implications," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-214, June.
    3. Tosun Mehmet S & Skidmore Mark L, 2007. "Cross-Border Shopping and the Sales Tax: An Examination of Food Purchases in West Virginia," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-20, December.
    4. Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarak, 2008. "The collection efficiency of the Value Added Tax: Theory and international evidence," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 391-410.
    5. Spencer Bastani & Sebastian Koehne, 2022. "How Should Consumption Be Taxed?," CESifo Working Paper Series 10038, CESifo.
    6. Andrew Feltenstein & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Biplab Datta & Sohani Fatehin, 2022. "A general equilibrium model of Value Added Tax evasion: an application to Pakistan," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 537-556, July.
    7. Claudio Agostini, 2004. "Tax Interdependence in American States," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 155, Econometric Society.
    8. Christian EBEKE & Hélène EHRHART, 2011. "Does VAT reduce the instability of tax revenues?," Working Papers 201124, CERDI.
    9. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2019. "Consumers as VAT “Evaders”: Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 21-67, April.
    10. Jesper Roine, 2006. "The political economics of not paying taxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 107-134, January.
    11. Christian EBEKE & Hélène EHRHART, 2011. "Does VAT reduce the instability of tax revenues?," Working Papers 201124, CERDI.
    12. Hansen, Mads J. N. G., 1999. "Cross-border Shopping and the Environment," ERSA conference papers ersa99pa206, European Regional Science Association.
    13. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2019. "Consumers as VAT “Evaders”: Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 21-67, April.
    14. Stiller, Wojciech & Heinemann, Marwin, 2024. "Do more harm than good? The optional reverse charge mechanism against cross-border tax fraud," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 61-84.
    15. Otusanya, Olatunde Julius, 2011. "The role of multinational companies in tax evasion and tax avoidance: The case of Nigeria," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 316-332.
    16. Lemelin, André & Savard, Luc, 2022. "What do CGE models have to say about fiscal reform?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 758-774.
    17. Alena Dugová, 2013. "Changes in the Value Added Tax as the Tool against the Global Crisis," European Financial and Accounting Journal, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2013(3), pages 74-93.
    18. Ke, Bin & Petroni, Kathy R. & Shackelford, Douglas A., 2000. "The impact of state taxes on self-insurance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 99-122, August.
    19. Ionel Bostan & Cristian Popescu & Costel Istrate & Ioan-Bogdan Robu, 2017. "The Impact of Taxation of the Domestic Economic Transactions on the Vat Collection Through Electronic Fiscal Devices," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 19(45), pages 581-581, May.
    20. Frederik Schmidt, 2008. "The Stability of Dynamic Contests with Asymmetric and Endogenous Prizes," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(4), pages 1-9.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:0706.0664. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.