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Do more harm than good? The optional reverse charge mechanism against cross-border tax fraud

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  • Stiller, Wojciech
  • Heinemann, Marwin

Abstract

The so-called ‘missing trader intra-community’ (MTIC) fraud causes enormous losses in value-added tax (VAT) revenue. The fraudsters take advantage of the zero-rated cross-border supplies within the European Union (EU) and resell the goods domestically without paying the received VAT to the tax authorities. One of the most prominent measures to combat this scheme is the optional reverse charge mechanism (RCM) that shifts the VAT liability from the supplier to the customer in business-to-business transactions. Using asymmetries in international trade (trade data gap, TDG), we identify the fraud-reducing effect of the RCM. For the observation period (2003 – 2019) within the EU, we quantify this effect in terms of the VAT revenue between 7.5 and 7.7 billion euros using a midpoint estimate. Additionally, we are the first to provide empirical evidence of a harmful fraud relocation from RCM countries to non-RCM countries. This explains the domino effect of RCM introductions in the EU and calls for a unified approach to VAT fraud.

Suggested Citation

  • Stiller, Wojciech & Heinemann, Marwin, 2024. "Do more harm than good? The optional reverse charge mechanism against cross-border tax fraud," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 61-84.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:95:y:2024:i:c:p:61-84
    DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2024.02.007
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax Evasion; International Trade; MTIC Fraud; Reverse Charge Mechanism; VAT Fraud; Trade Data Gap;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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