Revisited water-oriented relationships between a set of farmers and an aquifer: accounting for lag effect
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Augeraud-Véron, Emmanuelle & Leandri, Marc, 2014.
"Optimal pollution control with distributed delays,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 24-32.
- Marc Leandri & Emmanuelle Augeraud-Véron, 2013. "Optimal pollution control with distributed delays," Post-Print hal-00798294, HAL.
- Emmanuelle AUGERAUD-VERON & Marc LEANDRI, 2013. "Optimal pollution control with distributed delays," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2013-03, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
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More about this item
Keywords
Non-point source pollution; Farming pollution; Aquifer; Nitrate; Time lag; Optimal control; Mechanism design;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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