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Competição Política, Grupos De Interesse E A Oferta De Serviços Públicos: Uma Análise Para Os Municípios Cearenses Nos Anos De 2005 E 2009

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  • FRANCISCO ANTONIO SOUSA DE ARAUJO
  • PAULO DE MELO JORGE NETO

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  • Francisco Antonio Sousa De Araujo & Paulo De Melo Jorge Neto, 2016. "Competição Política, Grupos De Interesse E A Oferta De Serviços Públicos: Uma Análise Para Os Municípios Cearenses Nos Anos De 2005 E 2009," Anais do XLII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 42nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 064, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2014:064
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