Disincentive Effects Of Social Security System With Disability Insurance Coverage On Labor Market
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IAS-2007-12-15 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2007-12-15 (Labour Economics)
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