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A model on interests representation and;accountability in small local governments

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  • Fabio FIORILLO

    (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali)

Abstract

Second generation theory of fiscal federalism do not consider two questions. 1) In small councils the relation between citizens and administrators is stronger than the one depicted in accountability models: in a small councils, citizens know directly and personally the administrators and they control them daily, not only in the electoral dates. 2) Local governments interpret and represent the local citizens' wishes to central government. Thus, they bargain with central government in order to represent local interests at central level. In this paper, even if governments are non benevolent both at local and central level, the accuracy in interpreting citizens' wishes is higher in small councils than in big ones, because citizens' control is higher in the former. On the contrary, the capacity of a council to make its requests be satisfied by central government is higher for a big council than for a small one. Thus, when the dimension of local government increases, the effectiveness of representation activity increases, but the objectives of citizens diverge from administrators' ones. Citizens face a trade-off between the strength of their local council in representing their interests at central level and the accuracy (accountability) in representing them. In this paper we propose a model which can tackle these two issues, we investigate on advantages of a territorial reform and we empirically validate the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio FIORILLO, 2011. "A model on interests representation and;accountability in small local governments," Working Papers 356, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    • Handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:356
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    3. Alessandro STERLACCHINI, 2012. "Patent Oppositions as Competitive Tools: An Analysis of the Major Players in the European Market of White Goods," Working Papers 374, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    4. Eralba CELA & Tineke FOKKEMA & Elena AMBROSETTI, 2012. "Links Between Transnationalism Integration and Duration of Residence: The Case of eastern European Migrants in Italy," Working Papers 386, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    5. Elena AMBROSETTI & Eralba CELA & Tineke FOKKEMA, 2011. "The Remittances Behaviour of the Second Generation in Europe: Altruism or Self-Interest?," Working Papers 368, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    6. Lenzu, Simone & Tedeschi, Gabriele, 2012. "Systemic risk on different interbank network topologies," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 391(18), pages 4331-4341.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Accountability; Fiscal Federalism; Interests Representation; Intergovernmental Grants; Territorial Reform;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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