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Las Crisis y los Modelos Económicos: Diagnósticos, Predicciones y las Políticas Económicas

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  • Horacio Piffano

Abstract

The paper attempts an explanation of the alleged "lack of adequate economic models" to predict and eventually avoid - using certain policy recommendations - the recurrent financial and fiscal crises, and finally, economic crisis, recurrently registered in the world. From author opinion, in the controversy over the "rational expectation" approach and the new design method of dynamic and stochastic models, have been neglected some important underlying issues in economic performance, as the very crucial institutional basis on which activities of economic agents operate, including as such particularly to governments. The Public Choice school and modern Institutional Economics can help to understand the limitations and possibilities facing economic theory in improving its status as "science."

Suggested Citation

  • Horacio Piffano, 2012. "Las Crisis y los Modelos Económicos: Diagnósticos, Predicciones y las Políticas Económicas," IIE, Working Papers 093, IIE, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
    • Handle: RePEc:akh:wpaper:093
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    Cited by:

    1. López, Ana M., 2016. "El papel de la información económica como generador de conocimiento en el proceso de predicción: comparaciones empíricas del crecimiento del PIB regional /The Role of Economic Information as a Generat," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 34, pages 543-572, Agosto.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic models; crises; institutions; public policies; regulations.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

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