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Effects of Passthrough Pricing Rules on Gas Purchase Decisions From Different Bassins

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  • Fernando Navajas

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Suggested Citation

  • Fernando Navajas, 1998. "Effects of Passthrough Pricing Rules on Gas Purchase Decisions From Different Bassins," IIE, Working Papers 009, IIE, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
  • Handle: RePEc:akh:wpaper:009
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    File URL: https://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/doc9.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    2. Yarrow, George, 1991. "Vertical Supply Arrangements: Issues and Applications in the Energy Industry," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 7(2), pages 35-53, Summer.
    3. Hollas, Daniel R, 1994. "Downstream Gas Pricing in an Era of Upstream Deregulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 227-245, September.
    4. Joskow, Paul L, 1974. "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 291-327, October.
    5. Sutherland, Ronald J., 1993. "Natural gas contracts in an emerging competitive market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(12), pages 1191-1204, December.
    6. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vladimir Hlasny, 2006. "Do Gas Cost Incentive Mechanisms Work? A Nation-Wide Study," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 50(1), pages 51-68, March.

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