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Governing the Financial System: A Theory of Financial Resilience

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  • Salter, Alexander
  • Tarko, Vlad

    (Mercury Publication)

Abstract

We develop a theory of financial stability based on insights from the literature on polycentric governance and institutional resilience. We contend that top-down regulatory approaches to achieving financial stability will prove ineffective, due to various

Suggested Citation

  • Salter, Alexander & Tarko, Vlad, 2017. "Governing the Financial System: A Theory of Financial Resilience," Working Papers 06954, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:ajw:wpaper:06954
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