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The Bank Liquidity Channel of Financial (In)stability

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua Bosshardt

    (Federal Housing Finance Agency)

  • Ali Kakhbod

    (Rice University)

  • Farzad Saidi

    (UniversityofBonn & CEPR)

Abstract

We examine the system-wide effects of liquidity regulation on banks’ balance sheets. In the general equilibrium model, banks have to hold liquid assets, and choose among illiquid assets varying in the extent to which they are difficult to value before maturity, e.g., structured securities. By improving the liquidity of interbank markets, tighter liquidity requirements induce banks to invest in such complex assets. We evaluate the welfare properties of combining liquidity regulation with other financial-stability policies, and show that it can complement ex-ante policies, such as asset-specific taxes, whereas it can undermine the benefits of ex-post interventions, such as quantative easing.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Bosshardt & Ali Kakhbod & Farzad Saidi, 2021. "The Bank Liquidity Channel of Financial (In)stability," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 108, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:108
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    liquidity regulation; securitization; interbank markets; financial stability; quantitative easing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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